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Comments 
A Matter of Balance: Mathews v. 
Eldridge Provides the Procedural 
Fairness Rhode Island’s Judiciary 
Desperately Needs 
Brett V. Beaubien* 
It should come as no surprise to members of Rhode Island’s 
bench and bar that our state’s incarceration rate (part of the 
larger phenomenon of mass incarceration in the United States) 
has been driven, in large part, by probation violations.  This issue 
has attracted the attention of the state’s judges, lawyers, and 
lawmakers, many of whom gathered en masse to attend a 
symposium held at Roger Williams University School of Law last 
spring, to begin the process of closely examining Rhode Island’s 
criminal justice system.  Subsequently, Governor Gina M. 
Raimondo issued an executive order on July 7, 2015, that 
established the Justice Reinvestment Working Group (“JRWG”).1  
The JRWG includes members from all three branches of state 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2016, Roger Williams University School of Law. 
I am beholden to my father, George N. Beaubien, Jr. for the title of this Note, 
as I am for learning to always seek the truth.  I am also indebted to Professor 
Jared A. Goldstein and Matthew D. Provencher for the superior insight and 
guidance they provided as I crafted this Note.  I could not have done this 
without either of you.  Thank you. 
 1.  Pat Murphy, Probation Tops Defense Bar’s Wish List for Governor’s 
Panel, R.I. LAW. WKLY., July 20, 2015, at 1, 1. 
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government, as well as local and federal officials,2 and is tasked 
with using a data-driven approach to develop policy that will 
reduce spending on criminal justice and increase public safety.3  
While the Supreme Court of the United States has not directly 
provided a solution to Rhode Island’s complicated problem, it has 
provided a mechanism by which our Judiciary can use to begin 
taking the necessary measures needed to alleviate the burdens of 
mass incarceration.  Through an application of the Due Process 
balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. 
Eldridge,4 this Note will apply that test to this critically 
important conversation and demonstrate that Rhode Island’s 
probation revocation standard fails to pass constitutional muster, 
and necessitates reform. 
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE 
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided Mathews v. Eldridge, 
thus providing a three-factor test that has since been used 
repeatedly to evaluate the procedural due process employed when 
the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.5  
The dispute in Mathews centered around whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) to provide a recipient of disability benefits 
an opportunity for a final evidentiary hearing prior to terminating 
those benefits.6  George Eldridge, the respondent, had been 
receiving SSA payments for four years before he received a letter 
in the mail informing him that, due to newly acquired medical 
information, his disability status—and thus, his benefits—would 
be terminated.7  The SSA provided notice giving Eldridge an 
 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  The Council of State Gov’ts, Justice Center, Rhode Island, https://csg 
justicecenter.org/jr/ri/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). 
 4.  424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
 5.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
594 (4th ed. 2011). 
 6.  424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).  This Note will refer to this balancing test 
as the “Mathews” test, consistent with the practice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States.  However, many lower state and federal courts and 
secondary sources refer to the balancing test as the “Eldridge” test.  See, e.g., 
Cathedral Rock of N. Coll. Hill, Inc. v. Shalala, 223 F.3d 354, 362 (6th Cir. 
2000); Penobscot v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 164 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1999); 
In re D.C.S.H.C., 733 N.W.2d 902, 907 (N.D. 2007).  
 7.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324.  
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opportunity to contest its decision to terminate at an evidentiary 
hearing before a final decision would be made.8  However, the SSA 
nevertheless terminated his benefits prior to the final evidentiary 
hearing.9  Eldridge challenged the SSA’s procedure, arguing that 
such termination constituted a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.10 
To guide its analysis of whether the SSA’s procedures 
satisfied the procedural protections demanded by the Due Process 
Clause, the Supreme Court stated that due process is not “a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances.”11  Instead, as the Court noted, due process is 
“flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.”12  Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
provided several factors for lower courts to employ when balancing 
the competing interests of the government and the individual: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.13 
The test is inherently designed to scrutinize governmental 
procedure, as courts are tasked with determining whether the 
competing interests of the individual and the government are in 
harmony with the protections required by the Constitution.  
Under the test, the scales tip in favor of requiring greater 
procedural safeguards because the significance of the private 
interest at stake and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that 
interest are high. 
In applying its newly-minted balancing test, the Mathews 
Court ultimately held that the SSA’s procedures fully comported 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. at 324–25. 
 11.  Id. at 334 (citations omitted). 
 12.  Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 13.  Id. at 335. 
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with the Due Process Clause.14  The Court reasoned as follows: 
First, the private interest in disability benefits is likely to be less 
significant than in a case where benefits are based on financial 
need;15  second, the decision to terminate benefits was made upon 
receipt of reliable medical records thus lowering the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of benefits;16  and third, the administrative 
burden and costs of an evidentiary hearing in all cases prior to 
terminating disability benefits would be disproportional to any 
extra benefit conferred upon the recipient.17 
Although Mathews concerned an administrative procedure, 
three years later the Supreme Court described the balancing test 
as a “general approach for testing challenged state procedures 
under a due process claim.”18  In the several decades that have 
followed, the Supreme Court has applied Mathews in a variety of 
contexts, including habeas corpus proceedings19 and cases 
involving prisoner’s rights.20  Through the Mathews decision and 
its resulting jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has provided lower 
courts with a workable analytic framework from which they can 
determine the form of procedural due process to which a person is 
entitled when the state deprives him or her of liberty or property 
in the civil context. 
A.  Rhode Island’s Application of Mathews v. Eldridge 
In 1984, the Rhode Island Supreme Court followed suit, 
adopting the Mathews test to determine whether an 
 
 14.  Id. at 349.  
 15.  Id. at 340.  
 16.  Id. at 345. 
 17.  See id. at 321–23. 
 18.  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979). 
 19.  See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008) (“The idea 
that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of 
any earlier proceedings accords with our [Mathews] test for procedural 
adequacy in the due process context”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
528–32 (2004) (applying Mathews to determine due process required that 
United States citizen being held as enemy combatant be given meaningful 
opportunity to contest factual basis for his detention). 
 20.  See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225–31 (2005) (applying 
Mathews when evaluating what level of process is due when a state places a 
prisoner in a super-max facility); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–
35 (1990) (applying Mathews to evaluate state procedure where prisoner 
underwent involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications). 
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administrative procedure involving a workers’ compensation claim 
violated due process.21  Since then, Mathews has been applied in 
Rhode Island in a variety of civil administrative contexts.22  
Notably, in Fitzpatrick v. Pare, where a plaintiff appealed a 
decision by the Rhode Island Registry of Motor Vehicles to 
suspend his drivers license, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
applied Mathews and held that the procedures employed by the 
registry presented an unacceptably high risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of the plaintiff’s interest in the continued use of his 
license pending the outcome of the hearing, despite the state’s 
strong interest in keeping dangerous drivers off the road.23 
In State v. Germane, Thomas Germane challenged a decision 
of the Sex Offender Board of Review (“Board”) on the grounds that 
the burden of persuasion should have been on the state at all 
times to prove that the Board’s findings of fact were not 
erroneous.24  Specifically, the procedure at issue required 
Germane to overcome a prima facie case by the Board setting his 
risk level by a preponderance of the evidence.25  Justice Robinson, 
for the Court, wrote that “[i]n cases involving procedural due 
process concerns, we have previously employed the three-part test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.”26 
The Court then applied an in-depth Mathews balancing test 
and found that the procedures utilized by the Board satisfied due 
process because the appellant was afforded an opportunity to 
rebut the prima facie classification with an excuse or justification 
 
 21.  John J. Orr & Sons, Inc. v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721, 722–23 (R.I. 1984). 
 22.   State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 574–82 (R.I. 2009) (applying the 
Mathews test to determine the level of process due in a challenge to a sex 
offender classification ruling by the Sex Offender Board of Review); 
Fitzpatrick v. Pare, 568 A.2d 1012, 1014–15 (R.I. 1990) (applying the 
Mathews test to determine the level of process due in a decision to suspend a 
drivers license by the Rhode Island Registry of Motor Vehicles); Shawmut 
Bank v. Costello, 643 A.2d 194, 199–202 (R.I. 1994) (applying the Mathews 
test to determine what process is due under statutory procedure for ex parte 
attachment in equitable actions); John J. Orr & Sons, Inc., 479 A.2d at 722–
23 (applying Mathews test in an employer’s challenge to a worker’s 
compensation claim). 
 23.  Fitzpatrick, 568 A.2d at 1014–15. 
 24.  Germane, 971 A.2d at 574. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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under the preponderance of the evidence standard.27  In its 
decision, the court looked to the Supreme Court of the United 
States for guidance as to how to weigh an evidentiary burden: 
“[I]n any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof 
tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the 
weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a 
societal judgment about how the risk of error should be 
distributed between the litigants.”28  The court held that the 
Board’s evidentiary procedure appropriately distributed the risk of 
error because the preponderance standard, which is lower than 
that employed in the criminal context, allows the defendant to 
rebut any evidence of mistaken or unlawful classification by the 
Board with information that is “peculiarly within [the appellant’s] 
own control and based upon knowledge immediately within his 
personal reach.”29 
While the Mathews test has been most frequently applied in 
the civil context, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
nevertheless expanded its reach to due process questions in 
criminal law.30  In State v. Oliveira, for example, a defendant 
challenged his assault conviction, claiming that the evidence 
presented at trial was inconsistent with the crimes charged in the 
indictment and bill of particulars, and therefore, he was denied 
notice and an opportunity to mount a defense.31  The court cited 
the Mathews test to determine whether the prosecution had 
deprived the defendant of due process and ultimately found no 
violation because the jury was instructed that it could have found 
Oliveira guilty of assault only if it found him guilty of conspiracy 
to commit assault, and the evidence to support that charge could 
also support an inference of assault.32  Accordingly, the defendant 
was not deprived of an opportunity to mount a defense, and as 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 581 (alteration in original) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 755 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Neary, 409 A.2d 551, 555 
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30.  See State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 923 (R.I. 2001) (applying the 
Mathews test to determine if defendant’s due process rights were violated at 
trial due to alleged inconsistencies between jury instructions and the 
indictment).  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. 
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such, there was no due process violation.33 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s application of Mathews 
illustrates that, in Rhode Island, state governmental proceedings, 
whether administrative or judicial, both civil and criminal, are 
subject to the procedural due process analysis of Mathews.  Yet, 
while probation revocation hearings fit neatly and naturally into 
the Mathews civil due process framework, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has never subjected the standard of proof in 
probation revocation hearings to the Mathews test. 
B. How Has Rhode Island’s Probation Revocation Standard 
Evaded Mathews Analysis? 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has established that 
probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature34 because 
they arise after conviction and are thus removed from the criminal 
process.35  Any doubt about this was firmly resolved in 1998, when 
the court, in State v. Smith, declared that: “[i]t is well established 
that [a] probation-revocation hearing ‘is not a prosecution but is 
civil in nature.’”36  Rhode Island’s highest court again affirmed its 
position in this regard in 2008, stating unequivocally that: “A 
probation-violation hearing is a civil proceeding to determine 
whether a probationer has kept the peace and been of good 
behavior . . . .”37 
The Rhode Island probation revocation standard was 
announced in 1968 in Walker v. Langlois.38  In Walker, the court 
considered what level of due process was required in probation 
revocation proceedings under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and held that, because such proceedings are 
sentencing procedures unrelated to criminal prosecutions, the Due 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  E.g., State v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 408 (R.I. 2008) (“A probation-
violation hearing is a civil proceeding to determine whether a probationer has 
kept the peace and been of good behavior, or otherwise violated a condition of 
probation.”). 
 35.  See State v. Delarosa, 39 A.3d 1043, 1051 (R.I. 2012); State v. Smith, 
721 A.2d 847, 848 (R.I. 1998). 
 36.  Smith, 721 A.2d at 848 (second alteration in original) (quoting State 
v. Hie, 688 A.2d 283, 284 (R.I. 1996)). 
 37.  Gautier, 950 A.2d at 408. 
 38.  243 A.2d 733, 737 (R.I. 1968). 
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Process Clauses do not require greater levels of protection.39  
Thus, the amorphous “reasonable satisfaction” standard that has 
significantly contributed to Rhode Island’s prison population was 
spawned. 
While it is unclear as to why the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
has yet to analyze the probation revocation standard under 
Mathews, it is undeniable that in Rhode Island, probation 
revocation hearings are civil proceedings, and Rhode Island’s 
highest court routinely applies the Mathews test to civil 
proceedings.  As such, the Rhode Island Supreme Court should 
follow its own precedent and evaluate the reasonable satisfaction 
standard under the Mathews three-pronged test. 
II. RHODE ISLAND’S STANDARD FAILS TO SATISFY MATHEWS V. 
ELDRIDGE 
Applying the Mathews test leaves no doubt that Rhode 
Island’s “reasonable satisfaction” standard of proof does not 
satisfy procedural due process protections. “Reasonable 
satisfaction”—what does that even mean?  As a legal standard, 
not only is it incredibly low, it is also exceptionally vague.  It 
places the majority of the burden of proof on the probationer, and 
risks erroneous incarceration.  Simply put, the standard fails to 
provide the safeguards that the Constitution and Mathews 
demand. 
A. The Private Interest Affected: The Right to be Free from 
Physical Constraint 
The Mathews test requires a court to consider the factors that 
were enumerated previously.  First, a court must identify “the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action.”40  In a 
probation revocation proceeding, the private interest at stake is 
the constitutional right to liberty, as revocation of probation 
results in incarceration.  As recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Gagnon, probationers enjoy the same liberty 
 
 39.  See id.; see also State v. Washington, 42 A.3d 1265, 1271 (R.I. 2012).  
Perhaps the Court has relied on the very nature of its civil characterization of 
probation violation proceedings as a justification for maintaining a lower 
standard of proof than that which is required in a criminal proceeding.  Such 
an argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 40.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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interest as parolees.41  Although this liberty is conditional, it 
nevertheless includes “many of the core values of unqualified 
liberty,” and constitutes a “grievous loss” on a person when such 
liberty is revoked.42  When describing the importance of this 
liberty interest, Daniel F. Piar wrote in the American Journal of 
Criminal Law: “the very fact that a convict is on probation 
indicates a considered judgment by the sentencing court that he is 
deserving of such valued liberty, whether because of his personal 
traits, his potential for rehabilitation, the nature of his crime, his 
criminal record, or some combination of these.”43 
As Justice O’Connor emphasized in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the 
Mathews scale is not offset against the individual merely because 
of the circumstances surrounding the allegations against him, for 
“[i]t is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection . . . .”44  The hardship of probation revocation is often 
worsened when a person is pulled away from, and cannot support, 
his or her family or other loved ones.  The probationer lives under 
a threat of incarceration45 and must be always on guard to keep 
himself from being denied the opportunity to maintain a normal, 
productive life, knowing that his behavior will have profound 
effects not just on him, but also those who depend on him.  These 
values should not be whisked away on a whim; each is critical to 
the successful rehabilitation of the probationer.46  Their guilty 
status notwithstanding, the interest probationers have in staying 
out of prison is strong because they have so much to lose if 
wrongfully incarcerated.  Accordingly, under Mathews, the 
probationer has an undeniable liberty interest significantly 
affected by the official action. 
 
 41.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). 
 42.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
 43.  Daniel F. Piar, A Uniform Code of Procedure for Revoking Probation, 
31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 130 (2003). 
 44.  See 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45.  See Timothy Baldwin & Olin Thompson, More Horse-Hair for the 
Sword of Damocles? The Rhode Island Probation System and Comparisons to 
Federal Law, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 244 (2016). 
 46.  See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481–82. 
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B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation is High 
A court must next consider the “risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards . . . .”47  The procedure here pivots on the standard of 
proof required to prove a probation violation—“reasonable 
satisfaction.”  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has not clearly 
defined “reasonable satisfaction,” although it has provided some 
hint as to its meaning, explaining that “the state need only show 
that ‘reasonably satisfactory’ evidence supports a finding that the 
defendant has violated his or her probation.”48  Other sources, 
however, place the standard below preponderance of the evidence, 
requiring only that a hearing justice or magistrate have a 
“rational belief” that the evidence of a violation is adequate and 
sufficient.49 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 
principle function of the standard of proof serves to “instruct the 
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks 
he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a 
particular type of adjudication.”50  Concerning, in particular, 
evidentiary standards of proof: “in any given proceeding, the 
minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process 
requirement reflects . . . a societal judgment about how the risk of 
error should be distributed between the litigants.”51  Thus, the 
court has explained why proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the 
established standard in criminal trials: The higher burden is on 
the state to prove the facts as true because a defendant, who is 
presumably innocent, will suffer the greatest loss of all, his 
liberty, if convicted.  Therefore, almost the entire risk of error 
would be borne by the state. 
The reasonable satisfaction standard in Rhode Island turns 
 
 47.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 48.  State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 310 (R.I. 2008) (citing State v. 
Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2004)). 
 49.  See, e.g., 2 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, § 
26:13, at 26–34 (2d ed. 1999). 
 50.  State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 582 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51.  Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755, (1982)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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that risk allocation entirely on its head.  It is perhaps the lowest 
standard of proof available, and therefore places almost the entire 
risk of error on the probationer.  This risk is simply too high to 
protect against the “grievous loss” that a probationer would suffer 
in an erroneous probation revocation.52  Falling below the 
preponderance standard, it creates a risk that a probationer could 
be sent back to prison even in situations where it is more likely 
than not that probation was never violated. 
The preponderance standard, however, evenly allocates the 
risk of error between litigants.53  In the probation context, this 
would require a magistrate to find sufficient facts to demonstrate 
that it is at least more likely than not that a probationer violated 
the terms of his probation.  The preponderance standard provides 
an objective measurement, which would force hearing magistrates 
to look more closely at the evidence before reaching a decision.  No 
longer would judges be empowered to support probation 
revocations on a mere “rational belief.” 
The scales, therefore, tip toward raising the standard of proof 
under the second prong of Mathews, because the reasonable 
satisfaction standard creates an intolerable risk of erroneous 
incarceration, and the probable value in raising the standard to 
the preponderance of the evidence will provide the necessary 
additional safeguard required by due process.54 
C. The Government’s Interests 
The final factor in a Mathews analysis requires a court to 
weigh “the Government’s interest,” while also considering any 
“fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”55 
Probation revocation hearings involve interests that 
“sometimes compet[e] and sometimes coincid[e].”56  By enabling 
the probationer to remain connected with society, probation is 
 
 52.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
 53.  State v. Davis, 641 A.2d 370, 374 (Conn. 1994). 
 54.  For a detailed discussion of the standard of proof for probation 
revocation proceedings and how Rhode Island’s compares to other states, see 
Lara Montecalvo, Kara Maguire & Angela Yingling, No Exit, No End: 
Probation in Rhode Island, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 316 (2016). 
 55.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 56.  Davis, 641 A.2d at 376. 
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rooted in the belief that a probationer will ultimately become a 
productive member of society by being provided with the 
opportunity to remain connected with people.  The government’s 
interest, however, is rooted in providing public safety.57  The 
purpose of probation is ultimately to serve both of these 
interests.58  They must both, therefore, be considered when 
weighing any additional procedural burden that may be placed on 
this system. 
The preponderance standard is unlikely to overburden the 
state’s interest in maintaining public safety and, perhaps, would 
better serve its interest in producing successful rehabilitative 
outcomes.59  While a higher standard of proof would add to the 
state’s burden in its attempt to prove a violation, this cannot—and 
should not—be characterized as “unfair.”  In fact, the Rhode 
Island Traffic Tribunal employs a higher “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard60 and nonetheless manages to obtain justice in 
traffic violations, an area where the public safety is also at stake, 
such as driving while under the influence of alcohol (refusal to 
submit to chemical test cases), speeding, and text messaging while 
driving.61 
Clear and convincing evidence means that the judge or 
magistrate must believe that the “truth of the facts asserted by 
the proponent is highly probable.”62  By way of comparison, the 
preponderance of the evidence is lower, meaning only that it is 
 
 57.  See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1. 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  See Davis, 641 A.2d at 375 (reasoning that a more reliable probation 
revocation procedure will reduce prison commitments based on erroneous 
revocation decisions, thereby allowing probationers to stay out of prison and 
become rehabilitated). 
 60.  See R.I. TRAFFIC TRIB. R.P. 17. 
 61.  Town of Glocester v. Mata, C.A. No. T14-0045 (R.I. Traffic Trib. April 
3, 2015) (per curiam) (appeal of trial magistrate’s decision to sustain violation 
of section 31-14-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws (prima facie limits)); 
State v. Kilsey, C.A. No. T13-0056 (R.I. Traffic Trib. March 3, 2014) (per 
curiam) (appeal of decision by trial judge to sustain violation of  section 31-
22-30 of Rhode Island’s General Laws, titled “Text Messaging While 
Operating a Motor Vehicle”); Sarhan v. Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-094 (R.I. 
Dist. Ct. October 10, 2012) (per curiam) (appeal from Appeals Panel decision 
sustaining the violation of section 31-27-2.1 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws for refusing to submit to a chemical test). 
 62.  State v. Fuller-Balletta, 996 A.2d 133, 142 (R.I. 2010). 
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more likely than not that the facts asserted are true.63  The 
administrative magistrates presiding over traffic violations 
routinely work under a higher burden to evaluate charges 
threatening the public safety and are presumably still able to 
serve that interest, otherwise it is likely that the Traffic Tribunal 
would amend its procedures.  The liberty interests at stake in 
traffic offenses are incomparable to those that are at stake in 
probation revocation hearings.64  Accordingly, Rhode Island’s 
district and superior court judges are more than capable of 
efficiently integrating the preponderance standard into the 
probation revocation process while maintaining the state’s public 
safety interests. 
When evaluating the state’s interest in successful 
rehabilitative outcomes, it is important to bear in mind the 
chronic nature of probation-based commitments in Rhode Island.65  
A reliable probation revocation process is one key factor that puts 
the state in the position to reach its goal of successful 
rehabilitation, and puts probationers in position to become 
rehabilitated.  A failed system, on the other hand, undermines the 
system and inhibits its effectiveness.  Through the imposition of 
such a low standard, probationers are incentivized to admit to a 
violation as part of a plea on new charges, even if no violation has 
occurred.66  Not only does this undermine the state’s interest in 
seeing probationers successfully complete their term of probation, 
it also contributes inherently to our overcrowded prisons.  A 
higher standard of proof, therefore, is likely to further serve the 
state’s interest by increasing rehabilitative outcomes and 
decreasing recidivism. 
A Mathews balancing analysis reveals that the risk of 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Town of Middletown v. Semenova, C.A. No. T11-0049 (R.I. Traffic 
Trib. March 26, 2012) (dismissing a laned roadway charge, holding the state 
failed to meet its burden because the officer only testified that he observed 
the defendant “swerve” into the breakdown lane and back into the lane of 
travel and did not testify as to whether the defendant performed the 
maneuver in a unsafe manner). 
 65.  COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., RHODE ISLAND JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP: THIRD MEETING 13 (Oct. 27, 2015) 
[hereinafter THIRD MEETING], https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/11/RhodeIslandWorkingGroup3.pdf. 
 66.  See Murphy, supra note 1, at 16. 
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erroneous incarceration is intolerably high when probation 
revocation proceedings are conducted under the reasonable 
satisfaction standard.  That standard is ambiguously low and, 
because it is a lower standard than a preponderance of the 
evidence, improperly assigns a majority of the risk to the 
probationer.67  The preponderance of the evidence, in contrast, is 
the standard of proof that appropriately spreads the risk of error 
equally among the state and the probationer, as is custom for a 
civil proceeding.  Furthermore, the preponderance standard better 
serves the state’s interest in seeking successful rehabilitation 
outcomes because it will produce a more reliable revocation 
proceeding.68  Finally, the preponderance standard will not 
unfairly burden the state’s ability to adjudicate probation 
violations because the courts are more than capable of adapting to 
this well-known and widely-used standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Rhode Island’s criminal justice system is currently battling 
mass incarceration and ineffective rehabilitation outcomes.  The 
JRWG is studying three areas that it has identified as being 
contributors to the unnecessarily high incarceration rates and 
increased costs: pretrial procedures, sentenced admissions, and 
probation.69  With an alarming 61% of commitments in Rhode 
Island prisons resulting from probation violations, probation is 
perhaps the most troubling of these categories.70  Despite its 
comparatively low incarceration rate,71  Rhode Island ranks third 
in the nation for the number of probationers per 100,000 
residents.72  Current predictions, however, suggest that Rhode 
Island’s prisoner population will increase by 11% by the year 
2025.73  Governor Raimondo’s JRWG has identified a high number 
 
 67.  See COHEN, supra note 49, § 26:13, at 26–34; cf. State v. Forbes, 925 
A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007); State v. Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1252 (R.I. 1995). 
 68.  See, e.g., Montecalvo et al., supra note 54. 
 69.  COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT WORKING 
GROUP: FIRST MEETING slide 23 (July 7, 2015), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/RIWG1handout.pdf. 
 70.  THIRD MEETING, supra note 65, at 13.  
 71.  In 2013, Rhode Island’s incarceration rate per 100,000 residents was 
194, compared to the U.S. average of 478.  See id. at 30.  
 72.  Id. at 31. 
 73.  Id. at 18. 
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of probation-violation based commitments, which are due in part 
to the low standard of proof by which a magistrate can revoke a 
defendant’s probation.74 
The “reasonable satisfaction” standard requires only that a 
fact-finder have a rational belief that the evidence is adequate to 
prove a probationer has violated the terms of his probation or has 
otherwise failed to “keep the peace and be on good behavior.”75  
On March 16, 2016, the presiding Justice of the Rhode Island 
Superior Court submitted changes to Rule 32(f) of the Rhode 
Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, among others, 
to elevate the revocation standard to a “fair preponderance of the 
evidence” to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for consideration.76 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court should approve the 
Superior Court’s proposal because probation revocation, as a civil 
proceeding, must comport with the procedural requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  These requirements can be determined 
by applying Mathews, and that application requires holding the 
reasonable satisfaction standard inadequate to meet 
constitutional minimums.  In so doing, many of the issues arising 
out of excessive probation will be mitigated.  The Rhode Island 
standard for probation violations is constitutionally insufficient, 
and this ready alternative is fully adequate to satisfy the needs of 
both the government and the Constitution. 
 
 
 74.  COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT WORKING 
GROUP: SECOND MEETING 47 (Sept. 10, 2015), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/RhodeIslandWorkingGroup2.pdf. 
 75.  State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013); State v. Gromkiewicz, 
43 A.3d 45, 48 (R.I. 2012); State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I. 2003); State 
v. Pinney, 672 A.2d 870, 871 (R.I. 1996)). 
 76.  Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Rhode 
Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and Superior Court 
Sentencing Benchmarks (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/ 
SupremeCourt/SupremeMiscOrders/Order-ProposedAmendmentsSuperior 
CourtRulesofCriminalProcedure-SentencingBenchmarks3-16-16.pdf. 
